From the perspective of your research field, what are the biggest challenges Europe is facing at the moment, and what are the biggest opportunities?

'There are several biggest challenges for Europe at the moment, both internally and externally. Internally, Europe is being undermined by the corrosive forces of illiberalism and populism and not only in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Romania) but also in Western Europe (e.g., in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy). Even when these forces are voted out, new governments struggle to find answers that are satisfying for their electorates (see the UK and Poland). Not unrelated to this is the fact that the EU is not living up to its full potential: growth is tepid and multiple crises form perfect sinkholes that nourish the populist backlash. These are not abstract things: for instance the housing crisis drives many of my students away from central cities like Amsterdam. Likewise, the social crisis feeds into the fertility crisis and so on. Not to mention that each of these issues crowds out long term challenges like climate change. So there are a lot of doom loops that need to be skillfully addressed by European policymakers.'

'Externally, Europe is now realising that it is a liberal actor in a realist world. The American safety net is gone and the policy of peace through trade has not exactly been successful. Regulation is not enough anymore and thorny questions of statecraft emerge: which resources for Europe, which decision making powers, which instruments to promote and defend European interests? Each external threat can drive a wedge between (and within) European states, thus undermining effective collective action. This is not the first time that it happens to a European polity. For instance, one of the reasons that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappeared from the map in the late 18th century was that external forces could exploit veto powers inside the Commonwealth and thus nip existential reforms in the bud.'

In terms of opportunities, Europe can use this series of crises to start adressing difficult problems effectively, from low productivity, to high inequality to climate change and so on. It is not the first time Europe is challenged by both internal and external forces.'

What developments, people, or events should we look out for in the coming year?

'To cite Yogi Berra, predictions are very difficult, especially about the future. But there are a few things we should be paying attention to. In 2024, 2025 and 2026 lots of elections happened or will happen that will define future European pathways. For one thing, I am curious whether the new German chancellor Friedrich Merz will manage to contribute to European solutions. For another, we are still waiting for the results of important elections in Central Europe. Obviously Romanians will play a crucial role. Polish presidential elections are also important because they will decide on whether democratic backsliding there can be reversed or whether it will be stuck in a problematic equilibrium. Likewise, Czechia and Hungary have important elections in 2025 and 2026, respectively. In Hungary, an opposition party (Péter Magyar’s TISZA) overtook Orban’s FIDESZ for the first time since at least 2012 (the oldest polls I have access to). Now the tricky question is what will happen if Magyar wins. Likewise, the French elections of 2027 will be top of the agenda.'

'So much for inside the EU. These elections will very much interact with events in the outside world, as the Canadian elections just showed. What will happen in Kyiv, Washington and other capitals will matter a lot.'

With trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU intensifying, how can the EU develop a more independent and robust trade policy that reduces reliance on the U.S. while ensuring its economic growth?

'Compared to other policy areas, Europe is well-equipped to deal with the U.S. and so far it has played its hand rather well. If it was bolder and if it really wanted to become more geopolitical as Von Der Leyen said in 2019, Europe would seize the opportunity to become a more important player on the world stage. Contrary to other polities, Europe’s weak center is a strength, to paraphrase an article by my colleagues Kate Alexander-Shaw, Joe Ganderson and Waltraud Schelkle. It both shields the EU from partisan polarization and makes it more predictable in strategic interactions. As a result, the EU is more credible and reliable as a world player. If Europe can limit vetoes exploited from outside the polity and if it can also implement stronger policies that dampen the undesired side effects of free trade, these features could underpin Europe’s leadership which, with better growth-enhanding reforms, could help form new trade ties that could compensate for current trade shocks. Another question is how Europe will deal with China’s overcapacity. The problem is that the latter could exacerbate backlash against the EU if it’s not protective enough. My recent research with Hanspeter Kriesi has shown for instance that while Europeans are a bit lukewarm about delegating power to Brussels, most of them really want Europe to act as a protective barrier against the stormy waters of world politics.'

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the need for economic resilience. How can the EU strengthen its economic resilience against future crises, both internal and external, without sacrificing long-term goals like sustainability and equality?

'The COVID-19 crisis has shown to Europe that if it acts together it can reduce the cost of dealing with crises and that there is considerable support to deal with such crises, as research by my colleagues Theresa Kuhn, Asli Unan, Francesco Nicoli, Bjorn Bremer and others show. Compare the reaction to the Euro Area crisis, the economic impact and the political consequences. At a relatively little cost (a small temporary fund like NGEU), Europe has managed to overcome past trauma and to pull its members out of a significant economic recession. The relatively successful management of the COVID-19 crisis has also limited – but not eliminated – political conflicts within and between countries, as my colleagues Ioana-Elena Oana, Alex Moise and Hanspeter Kriesi show in a new book at Oxford University Press. This was a significant step that also showed that long term goals do not have to be sacrified on the altar of short term elections. The lion share of NGEU was geared towards addressing long term issues like climate change, digitalization or poor infrastructure, not to mention facilitating reforms. In fact the NGEU tracker on the Commission’s website suggest that these targets have been exceeded. But the disbursement of NGEU is still pretty slow: as of March 2025, only around 50% of the funds’ money has been disbursed with significant variation across countries. This suggests that for Europe to be resilient, its member states need also to improve their state capacity. However, the absorption capacity of NGEU is not a new problem: over the last decades, this was already discussed and analysed many times for structural funds for instance. So the answers to these issues are known. However, some crises erode state capacity: for instance, populist backlashes and illiberal policies are sometimes geared towards undermining state capacity. This is an apparent paradox because these governments are seemingly elected on platforms of “getting things done” like the Tories in the UK with Brexit.'

We’re witnessing rising economic tensions across Europe. How do you see these challenges impacting the long-term stability of the European Union’s economy?

'This is the crucial question for Europe. Part of these economic tensions stem for European integration itself (the EU can decrease inequality between countries, but it can also increase inequality within countries), part of these tensions come from the crises that the EU deals with often times imperfectly (although it should be said that member states states would be worse off without the EU and the Euro). So Europe needs to manage both territorial and social inequalities.'

'Territorial inequality is important because if countries realise they have nothing to gain from European integration, they can be incentivised to leave: implicitly every country and citizen benchmark themselves against other EU countries and neighbors. For this type of inequalities, the EU has developped powerful tools like structural funds and so on. These instruments have – more often than not – helped receiving countries to accelerate their development, but not always. Think for instance of the stark contrast between Poland and Hungary, or Spain and Greece. NGEU has also aimed at reducing territorial inequalities and thus has mitigated centrifugal forces within the EU. Finally, Brexit has also undermined the idea of leaving the EU – so far. So hopefully territorial inequalities will not challenge the long-term stability of the EU.'

'By contrast, social inequality can drive populist and illiberal backlashes that then feed into Brussels. My colleagues Brian Burgoon, Maurizio Ferrara, Anna Kyriazi, Marcello Natili, Stefano Ronchi and Joan Miro (the last four have a new book on this issue: “Social Policy and EU Polity-building Through Crises and Beyond”) and many other people have studied Europe’s attempts at mitigating social challenges. There are some promising developments, but the truth is that most capacity to deal with social issues is at the member state level. So it looks like the EU can do little apart from buffering or, as the pioneering research of Waltraud Schelkle suggests, “reinsuring” the member states. But that would already be a lot, given the counterfactual of not having the EU.'